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IMMIGRATION AND COOPERATIVE




What can the new federalism teach us about what is
happening in immigration law? The changing relationship of
federal-state government in the regulation of immigrants has
led to the creation of "immigration federalism" as a field of
scholarship. Most of this scholarly attention has been directed
at resisting restrictionist legislation that encourages vigorous
law enforcement against undocumented immigrants. The
scholarly tilt is especially pronounced since the United States
Supreme Court recently struck down several provisions of S.B.
1070, Arizona's restrictive law enforcement legislation.'
However, law enforcement is only one type of regulation, and
the overwhelming focus on it skews the broader debate about
the proper place of states in regulating immigrants. According
to recent statistics, restrictionist state law is on the decline
and, as of mid-2013, there has been an increase in inclusionary
state laws.2
In light of this shifting landscape, this Essay attempts to
* Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School. I would like thank
Melissa Hart and participants in the Rothgerber Symposium at University of
Colorado Law for inspiring dialogue that resulted in this Essay. Thanks also to
Fred Bloom, Carey DeGenaro, Clare Huntington, Hiroshi Motomura, Helen
Norton, Phil Weiser, and the editors of the University of Colorado Law Review for
their helpful comments and thoughtful conversations.
1. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). See Juliet Stumpf, States
of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power of Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV.
1557, 1566-71 (2008) (suggesting that regulation by states preexisted recent
events); see also Monica Varsanyi et al., A Multilayered Jurisdictional Patchwork:
Immigration Federalism in the United States, 34 LAW & POL'Y 138, 140-43 (2012)
(pointing to the noteworthy scale of recent developments).
2. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, IMMIGRATION
POLICY REPORT 2-4 (2013), available at http://www.ncsl.org/documents/statefed/
ImmigrationReportAugust20l3.pdf; see also Inclusive Policies Advance
Dramatically in the States: Immigrants' Access to Driver's Licenses, Higher
Education, Workers' Rights, and Community Policing, THE NAT'L IMMIGRATION
LAw CTR., Oct. 2013, available at http://www.nilc.org/document.html?id=963.
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advance the discussion beyond the normative dimension of
immigration federalism-whether states should be involved in
the enterprise-to consider how states can be involved. Part I
makes the case that cooperative federalism in immigration is
legally permissible and normatively desirable in some
instances. Part II describes the attributes of cooperative
federalism in immigration law. Part III uses the rise of state
DREAM Acts as an illustration of cooperative federalism at
work.
I. OVERCOMING IMMIGRATION LAW'S EXCEPTIONALISM
Other esteemed scholars-including many of the
participants in this conference and Heather Gerken, in her
keynote address for this Symposium3-have carefully charted a
shift in federalism debates from dueling sovereigns toward
cooperative federalism. In brief, the dueling sovereigns view
envisions state and federal governments as having separate
spheres of influence. 4 Cooperative federalism, in contrast,
presumes that federal and state governments share power over
certain affairs and permits cooperation among them. 5
A. Plenary Power Preemption
By and large, immigration federalism lags behind other
policy arenas in the move toward cooperative federalism. It
remains preoccupied with dueling sovereigns. Indeed, the
sovereign account of federalism is even more heavily
emphasized in immigration law because immigration law
emphasizes the federal government's primacy-some would say
exclusivity-as an inherent power of a national sovereign. 6
3. Heather Gerken, J. Skelly Wright Professor of Law, Yale University,
Keynote Address at the University of Colorado Law School Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr.
Conference: The Political Safeguards of Horizontal Federalism (Nov. 7, 2013).
4. Id. ("The core divide between scholars and the Supreme Court centers on
sovereignty.").
5. See, e.g., Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for
Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663 (2001).
6. T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP 191
(7th ed. 2012) (citing Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889),
for the proposition that "[t]he power of exclusion of foreigners [is] an incident of
sovereignty belonging to the government of the United States, as a part of those
sovereign powers delegated by the Constitution"). See Michael Wishnie,
Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection,
1088 [Vol. 85
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Beyond the inherent powers account, the plenary power
doctrine has long served to protect congressional purposes in
immigration law by emphasizing broad national interests such
as uniformity in foreign relations. The Doctrine results in
extraordinary judicial deference to the political branches on
immigration matters.7
Since the first federal immigration legislation was enacted
in 1875 and consolidated in the Immigration and Nationality
Act in 1952,8 much analysis of immigration power turns on
preemption: whether Congress, through enactment of
comprehensive federal legislation, intended to lay claim to all
matters related to immigration. 9 Express preemption is the
easy part of the analysis, where the federal government makes
clear that states cannot regulate. Implied preemption is the
more difficult part of the analysis. Most immigration law cases
are decided on implied conflict preemption. The question of
whether there is a conflict between federal and state laws
meriting preemption of the state law turns on Congress's
purposes and objectives. As elsewhere, congressional intent is
often an elusive matter.
In immigration law, the search for congressional intent
suffers from two additional problems. First, it can be overly
mechanistic as a result of the plenary power doctrine. As a
result, "[preemption] provides only a blunt tool for difficult
situations in which policy concerns may call for more nuanced
approach."' 0
In an aptly titled article, Plenary Power Preemption,
and Federalism, 22 IMMIGR. & NAT'LITY L. REV. 51 (2001) (setting forth a
powerful case that immigration power is nondevolvable and nondelegable).
7. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 6, at 195. For an account of the role of the
plenary power doctrine in immigration law, see Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration
Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and
Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 550-54 (1990) (citing several
foundational immigration cases claiming Congress's dominance over immigration
law. In Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909), for
example, the Court declared, "[olver no conceivable subject is the legislative power
of Congress more complete than it is over [the admission of aliens].").
8. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537).
9. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 6, at 196-98.
10. Erin F. Delaney, In the Shadow of Article I: Applying a Dormant
Commerce Clause Analysis to State Laws Regulating Aliens, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1821, 1826 (2007); see also Clare Huntington, Constitutional Dimension of
Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787, 795 (2008) (describing federalism
lens as "vastly superior to the blunt tool of structural preemption").
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Professor Kerry Abrams argues that the Supreme Court in
Arizona v. United States" used its conception of federal
sovereignty to improperly import notions of plenary power
deference into its decision defending the federal role in law
enforcement.12  The Court announced: "[the federal
government] has broad, undoubted power over the subject of
immigration and the status of aliens."' 3 Describing the
doctrinal approach that links this rhetorical statement about
federal sovereignty with the preemption of state law is tricky.
Abrams claims that the Court's paean to federal power bleeds
into its preemption analysis, even though it is arguably not
relevant. 14 The Court's faulty framework results in misplaced
deference to federal law, as if it were a border-related matter
within Congress's sole purview.15
B. Immigration Law Between Borders
Second, preemption also suffers from the tough task of
characterizing immigration laws that indirectly enforce borders
as opposed to laws that regulate immigrants between borders.
For example, the Supreme Court in DeCanas v. Bical6 upheld
on preemption grounds a state labor law that forbade
employers from hiring undocumented workers if the hiring
hurt lawful workers. In an earlier Supreme Court case
reviewing a similar employment provision, Traux v. Raich,17
the Court held that encroachments on a person's "livelihood"
effectively discourages them from living in the United States
and therefore constitutes an attempt to enforce federal
11. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
12. Kerry Abrams, Plenary Power Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV. 601 (2013).
13. 132 S. Ct. at 2498 (citations omitted).
14. Abrams, supra note 12, at 602-03 (calling the opinion a "doctrinally empty
reaffirmation of federal power, coupled with field and conflict preemption
analysis").
15. Id. at 618. Among examples of the Court's use of this approach is Graham
v. Richardson, in which the Court invalidated state laws limiting welfare
eligibility to United States citizens or long-time lawful residents. 403 U.S. 365
(1971). See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1982) (striking down state provision
granting preferential tuition treatment to citizens and immigrant aliens over
nonimmigrant aliens on the premise that states may not discriminate on the basis
of alienage without Congressional sanction).
16. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
17. 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
1090 [Vol. 85
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immigration law.18 More recently, federal enforcement efforts
by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to reduce the
undocumented population through "attrition through
enforcement" and state laws directed at "self-deportation" of
undocumented immigrants who become discouraged by their
hostile environment raise similarly vexing challenges through
their indirect implications for immigration law at the borders. 19
Even if there are undoubtedly tough cases that blur the
line between immigration law and laws that regulate
immigrants, the reality is that not all immigration law takes
place at the borders. Regulation of immigrants also takes place
between borders. This Essay concerns regulations that touch on
education, housing, drivers' licenses, and health care, which
are ostensibly matters of shared concern for state and federal
government, if not traditionally the province of state
government. 20 Regulating immigration in the sense of
enforcing federal immigration law at the borders is not the
same as regulating immigrants between borders.
18. See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW (forthcoming
June 2014) (discussing Traux example and housing analogies).
19. Examples of such policies indirectly regulating borders include local laws
prohibiting landlords from renting apartments to immigrants to keep them from
setting up home and laws prohibiting the establishment of immigrant businesses
keep them from setting up shop. See infra notes 61-62. Scholars who have focused
on these hard cases include Pratheepan Gulasekaram & S. Karthick
Ramakrishnan, Immigration Federalism: A Reappraisal, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2074,
2109 (2013) ("[S]ubfederal action and federal lawmaking are inextricably linked,
with the former exerting a gravitational pull on the latter"); Cristina Rodriguez,
The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567,
618 (2008) (cautioning against a "division of labor" approach toward state-federal
relations); Adam Cox, Immigration Law's Organizing Principles, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 341, 351-56 (2008) (enumerating plenary power, immigration versus
alienage, and immigration federalism as three subjects organized around a
distinction between rules that select immigrants and those that regulate outside
of selection); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and Alienage, Federalism and
Proposition 187, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 201, 202-03 (1994) [hereinafter Immigration &
Alienage] (recognizing tension between immigration and alienage law and yet
retaining the distinction).
20. For more examples of state regulation of immigration, see Gerald
Neuman, The Lost Century of Immigration Law (1776-1785), 93 COLUM. L. REV.
1833 (1993). Courts have also recognized state and local immigration power in
DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354-56 (1976) ("[Sltanding alone, the fact that
aliens are the subject of a state statute does not render it a regulation of
immigration .... ).
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II. IMMIGRATION AND COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM
How then should immigration preemption operate after
Arizona v. United States? This Essay proposes that
immigration federalism should be harmonized with the
principles of cooperative federalism. Granted, the operation of
cooperative federalism in the immigration context departs from
traditional instances of cooperative federalism wherein states
administer federal policy by statutory design.2 1 Still, this Essay
sets out a few guiding principles for cooperative federalism in
the immigration context inspired by analogous contexts.
As a general matter, harmonization would require that
when state laws regulate immigrants' everyday affairs, the
usual presumptions would apply.22 (For example, a
presumption of concurrent jurisdiction and shared power
between state and federal government.) This startling
presumption-the reverse of what usually applies in
immigration law-could then be overcome by setting out
criteria specific to immigration-related considerations that
justify federal primacy.
More specifically, this Essay offers these two guiding
principles (and a caveat):
1. Border Law vs. Law Between Borders: Scholars first need
to distinguish between immigration law as border law
and the regulation of immigrants between borders,
where it is possible to make a distinction. 23 If borders,
foreign relations, or other national concerns that have
justified the plenary power doctrine are clearly
presented, the federal law trumps state law.
21. See Weiser, supra note 5, at 668 ("[Tlhe Supreme Court has suggested that
this term [cooperative federalism] best describes those instances in which a
federal statute provides for state regulation or implementation to achieve
federally proscribed policy goals.").
22. Gabriel Chin has similarly called for a reworking of immigration
exceptionalism. See Gabriel Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative
Apology and Prediction for Our Strange But Unexceptional Constitutional
Immigration Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257 (1999). Cf. Hiroshi Motomura,
Federalism, International Human Rights, and Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1361 (1999).
23. Once again, the distinction underlying this principle is sometimes
complicated and not always possible. See supra text accompanying note 19.
1092 [Vol. 85
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2. Modified Preemption Analysis: If plenary power
justifications are not clearly presented, the preemption
framework applies in a modified form. Initially courts
applying preemption analysis should consider the
possibility that Congress intended or was open to federal
and state cooperation, rather than assuming at 'the
outset that any state law will lead to conflict. 24 The
federal government's purposes should be uncovered
through usual techniques of statutory interpretation that
might uncover statutory exceptions and gaps. If there is
apparent conflict, the courts should take an additional
step before dispensing with the preemption analysis.
Courts should consider the states' purposes in
effectuating its own law, in addition to the purpose of the
federal law. If the purpose is cooperative, the law should
more likely stand, consistent with the presumption
against preemption. If the purpose is to thwart federal
law, the law should more likely be stricken. The state
purpose inquiry serves as a check on state laws that
intend to be uncooperative with federal purposes.
The modified preemption analysis is subject to an
important caveat. If the state law threatens Equal Protection
safeguards, 25 the starting presumption of state governance is
also overcome. This caveat provides a check on violations of the
basic Constitutional rights of persons, which includes
nondiscrimination against immigrants. 26
24. Part II of Gerald Neuman's article recounts an important episode in
history when states and localities regulated immigration prior to the enactment of
the first federal immigration legislation in 1875. See Neuman, supra note 20, at
841-83.
25. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause
protects Chinese immigrants in a case concerning discriminatory enforcement of a
San Francisco ordinance regulating laundries. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
26. Importantly, this Essay's sequencing of rights concerns as the last step in
the proposed framework does not mean to overlook the significance of Equal
Protection challenges to state measures. It gives rights considerations shorter
treatment given that they are not usually the central challenge in inclusionary
state laws and because they have been written about extensively elsewhere. See,
e.g., Jennifer Chacon, The Transformation of Immigration Federalism, 21 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 577, 611-15 (2012) (discussing how Section 2(b) of Arizona's SB
1070 allows impermissible violations of immigrants' constitutional rights);
Immigration & Alienage, supra note 19; see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens,
Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7 CONST. COMMENT. 9, 34 (1990) ("The
immigration power should be brought within the fold of other congressional
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
This proposal requires a more nuanced approach to
reconciling conflict than mechanistically invoking plenary
power or federal preemption every time the word "immigration"
is spoken. The nuance inheres in trying to permit the
possibility of state engagement while preserving important
fedbral interests that are distinctively important to
immigration law.
Continuing to develop this analysis requires systematically
thinking through multiple case studies of cooperative
federalism from several different areas of immigration law
between borders, including both inclusive and exclusive state
legislation. For the purposes of the Rothgerber Symposium,
this Essay will conclude with a discussion of a single case
study, state DREAM Acts, to illustrate the cooperative
federalism framework in operation.
III. APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK: STATE DREAM ACTS
A. Brief Background on State DREAMActs
In the mid-1990s, a flurry of state activity set the stage for
events still unfolding today. California took the lead in limiting
many benefits for immigrants in Proposition 187.27 While a
federal court struck down most of Proposition 187 in LULAC v.
Wilson,28 it retained the provision restricting educational
benefits. Congress went on to emulate the state law in the 1996
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act (PRWORA) and Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).29 States responded in
force. While states could not provide a pathway to citizenship,
they could provide access to higher education on the theory
powers and subjected to the constitutional limits normally applied to those
powers.").
27. 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 187 (West) (codified as CAL. PENAL CODE §§
113, 114, 834b; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10001.5; CAL. WELF. & INST. PREC. §
130; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 130; CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 18215, 66010.8;
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53069.65) (sections codified in order as they appear in the
proposition).
28. 908 F. Supp. 755, 771, 772 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
29. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 7, 8, 21, 25, 42 U.S.C.); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546
(1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8, 18, and 28 U.S.C.).
[Vol. 851094
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that education would enhance the life chances of immigrants.
Although they vary in scope, most of the state laws provide
educational access in the form of college admissions without
regard to status and discounted tuition to children of
undocumented immigrants who meet certain qualifications,
including that the students arrived at a young age, lack status
through no fault of their own, and are making good faith
attempts to attain lawful status. 30 More than fifteen states now
have versions of these laws, known as state DREAM Acts in
reference to proposed federal legislation that would provide the
same beneficiaries with a pathway to citizenship. 31 The
existence of this patchwork of state laws sets up the
cooperative federalism problem: states provide a public
benefit-in-state tuition-that seems to violate federal
immigration law at least superficially.
30. See generally Stephen Nelson et al., Reduced Tuition Benefits for
Undocumented Immigrant Students: The Implication of a Piecemeal Approach to
Policymaking, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 898 (2013).
31. Id. These states are California, CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68130.5 (West 2013);
Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 23-7-110 (2013); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. §
10a-29(9) (2013); Illinois, 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/7e-5 (2013); Kansas, KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 76-731a(2) (2013); Maryland, MD. CODE. ANN. EDUC. § 15-106.8
(West 2013); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 85-502 (2013); New Mexico, N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 21-1-4.6 (2013); New York, N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 355(2)(h)(8) (Consol. 2013);
Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. 70 § 3242.2 (2013); Oregon, OR. LAWS 2013 Ch. 17 § 2
(2013); Texas, TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 54.052 (West 2005); Utah, UTAH CODE
ANN. § 53B-8-106 (West 2013); and Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
28B.15.012 (West 2012). Wisconsin's governor revoked its statute permitting in-
state tuition for undocumented students in 2011. WIS. STAT. § 36.27(2) (2009)
(repealed 2011). Additionally, the Board of Regents has implemented policies
extending in-state tuition to undocumented immigrants in Hawaii,
Massachusetts, and Michigan. See Univ. Haw. Board of Regents Policies &
Bylaws, Ch. 6 § 6-9 (2013) (Hawaii); Richard P~rez-Pefia, Immigrants to
Pay Tuition at Rate Set for Residents, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/20/us/illegal-immigrants-to-pay-in-state-tuition-
at-mass-state-colleges.html?_r=0 (Massachusetts); Kellie Woodhouse, University
of Michigan Approves In-State Tuition for Military, Unauthorized Immigrants,
ANN ARBOR NEWS (July 18, 2013, 5:00 PM), http://www.annarbor.com/
news/university-of-michigan-governing-board-passes-tuition-equality-for-military-
unauthorized-immigrants/ (Michigan); Board of Governors of Higher Education
Student Residency Policy (S-5.0) (Rhode Island). More recently, bills were
introduced in New Jersey and Indiana that would extend in-state tuition to
undocumented immigrants. They are currently being considered by the
legislatures. See Tuition Equality Act, A4225, 215th Leg. (N.J. 2013) (New
Jersey); S.B. 420, 118th Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (Ind. 2013) (Indiana).
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
B. Toward a Doctrinal Framework for Cooperative
Federalism
Operationalizing the principles of cooperative federalism is
not easy 32 and has not frequently been attempted in the
immigration context.33 This part of the Essay takes initial
steps toward forging a framework by applying the guiding
principles of cooperative federalism to the state DREAM Acts.
1. Distinguishing Border Law and Regulation of
Immigrants Between Borders
The operational framework begins with the critical
analytical step of distinguishing education as regulation of
immigrants between borders, rather than immigration law per
se, because it does not really deal with issues related to the
border.
There is legal support for the proposition that education is
not about * borders. Plyler v. Doe34 prohibited states from
excluding undocumented children from public schools at the K-
12 level. 35 While Plyler would need to be extended to cover
higher education,36 its reasoning distinguishes education as a
non-border issue. The rationale of the case centers on the task
of state integration once immigrants have entered the country,
regardless of how they did so.37 As the Court says, any other
course of action would lead to the creation of an underclass:
"the children who are plaintiffs in these cases are special
members of [the] underclass" and without an education, "these
undocumented children, [already] disadvantaged as a result of
poverty, lack of English-speaking ability, and undeniable racial
prejudices . . . will become permanently locked into the lowest
32. Abbe Gluck, Associate Professor, Yale University Law School, Address at
the University of Colorado Law School Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr. Conference:
Federalism without Doctrine (Nov. 8, 2013) (calling for the establishment of an
organizational doctrinal structure with which to analyze issues of federalism).
33. Rodriguez, supra note 19, at 581.
34. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
35. Id. at 230.
36. See generally MICHAEL OLIvAs, No UNDOCUMENTED CHILD LEFT BEHIND:
PLYLER V. DOE AND THE EDUCATION OF UNDOCUMENTED STUDENTS (2012).
37. MOTOMURA, supra note 18, at 137 (describing integration of unauthorized
immigrants as a core theme of Plyler).
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socio-economic class."38
Similar reasoning appears in the bill history for
California's AB 540, a state law extending in-state tuition to
undocumented students. The legislative committee considered
that undocumented students were ineligible for federal and
state financial aid and faced financial barriers to attending
college. 39 Supporters of the bill argued that this measure would
help talented California high school students, who could not
otherwise afford to pay nonresident tuition, to afford college. 40
At both the K-12 and higher-education level, the reasoning for
providing the benefit of educational access is not about
avoiding the award of a public benefit that would attract
unlawful migration across borders, as some argue an economic
benefit would. 41 Consequently, the plenary power presumption
does not apply.
2. Modified Preemption Analysis
Second, the operational framework would recognize the
possibility that states have a place at the table when state
regulation is not tantamount to border law. The starting point
for this presumption is that states traditionally regulate
education. Given that background assumption, the legitimacy
of state regulation is a sensible place to start. In the example of
education, the state scheme for including immigrants in higher
education was in place before federal laws were enacted on the
matter in 1996.42 The AB 540 bill analysis says, "[t]he
educational rights of undocumented students is a longstanding
38. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 207-08, 219 (quoting Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569,
577 (E.D. Tex. 1978)).
39. Cal. B. An., A.B. 540, Assemb. Comm. Higher Educ., 2001-2002 Reg. Sess.
(Cal., Apr. 17, 2001).
40. See id.
41. The Plyler decision accepts the district court's distinction between
undocumented immigrants trying to enter their children in public school and
"those illegal aliens who entered the country alone in order to earn money to send
to their dependents in Mexico, and who, in many instances, remained in this
country for only a short period of time." 457 U.S. at 207 & n.3. There is empirical
support for the Supreme Court's assumption that most people do not migrate for
public schools; indeed, they typically know little about the public schools in the
country they will enter. See Ming H. Chen, Who Migrates and Why: Plyler v. Doe
in the Modern Era (May 7, 2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author),
abstract available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1557186.
42. See Proposition 187 discussion and accompanying text, supra notes 27-29.
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issue that has been debated within legislative and judicial
arenas for years."43 Underscoring the legitimate role of the
states, the legislative materials surrounding the adoption of
the bill pointed to proposed federal legislation that would have
allowed states to set their own residency requirements and
repealed IIRIRA section 1623.44
Placed alongside federal immigration law, the potentially
conflicting state DREAM Acts necessitate a preemption
analysis. Most of the cases evaluating state DREAM Acts have
been agreeable to state regulation 45 and employ a conventional
preemption inquiry. That conventional preemption inquiry can
be modified to better support the possibility of state
involvement. The modified preemption analysis would begin
with direct delegations of authority from the federal
government. This is the easy part of the analysis in which
courts consider that Congress intended the possibility of state
regulation through its express statutory language and
exceptions. For the DREAM Act example, in 1996, Congress
enacted two laws expressly limiting the ability of states to offer
in-state tuition to undocumented immigrants. The 1996 welfare
reform (PRWORA) established a means for determining
whether aliens are eligible for public benefits administered by
local, state, and federal governments. Section 1621(a) says that
any alien who is not legally in the country "is not eligible for
any State or local public benefit."46 "Public benefit" is further
defined to include postsecondary education benefits "for which
payments or assistance are provided by . .. an agency of a
State or local government or by appropriated funds of a State
or local government."47 However, § 1621(d) offers an exception:
it permits states to offer benefits to unlawful immigrants if
they enact a state law that "affirmatively provides" for such
eligibility.48 Many of the state DREAM Acts are enacted
pursuant to this "affirmatively provides" language.
43. Cal. B. An., A.B. 540, Assemb. Comm. Higher Educ., 2001-2002 Reg. Sess.
2 (Cal., Apr. 17, 2001), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/publ01-02/bill/
asmlab_0501-0550/ab_540_cfa_20010909_121021_senfloor.html.
44. See H.R. 1918, 107th Cong. (2001).
45. Challenges have been brought in Texas, Arizona, North Carolina, and
other states, and most have either been upheld or dismissed for lack of standing.
Nelson et al., supra note 30, at 919-29.
46. 8 U.S.C. § 1621(a) (2013).
47. Id. § 1621(c)(1)(B).
48. Id. § 1621(d).
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Matters become more difficult when PRWORA's statutory
exception is placed alongside the IIRIRA. 49 IIRIRA was enacted
the same year (1996) as PRWORA, and it expressly restricts
access to postsecondary education benefits for undocumented
students.5 0 Section 1623 says that unlawful aliens "shall not be
eligible on the basis of residence within a State . . . for any
postsecondary education benefit unless a citizen or national is
eligible for such a benefit . . . without regard to whether the
citizen or national is such a resident."5 1 In other words, the
language prohibits states from granting in-state tuition to
undocumented immigrants on the basis of in-state residency. 52
State laws that award in-state tuition on the basis of residency
"conflict" with the federal statute.
At this point, courts turn to an even more difficult part of
the analysis-implied preemption-to reconcile the apparent
conflict between state and federal law. The modified analysis
would look to state purpose as well as federal purpose in its
confrontation with the apparent conflict. Of the handful of
judicial challenges concerning state DREAM Acts, Martinez v.
Regents of the University of California53 exemplifies this
approach. In Martinez, the California Supreme Court grappled
with implied preemption before upholding AB 540, California's
DREAM Act,54 on modified preemption grounds. The Court
conceded an apparent conflict between AB 540 and IIRIRA's
prohibition on the residency-based public benefits such as in-
state tuition.55 However, the California Supreme Court
reasoned that the state's grant of in-state tuition was based on
requirements other than residency (e.g., attendance and
graduation from a California high school). 56 In reaching this
conclusion, the California Supreme Court found that "Congress'
enactment of a provision defining the pre-emptive reach of a
statute implies that matters beyond that reach are not
49. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(JIRIRA), Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified in scattered
sections of 8, 18, and 28 U.S.C.).
50. 8 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (2013).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. 241 P.3d 855 (2010).
54. Id. at 868. See CAL. EDUC. CODE. § 68130.5 (West 2013).
55. Martinez, 241 P.3d at 861.
56. Id.
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preempted."57 This exercise in statutory interpretation
demonstrates the presumption against preemption that
operates in general, but it stands in tension with the operation
of preemption in immigration federalism cases. 58
As for California's purpose in enacting AB 540, it was
arguably not to undermine a broad definition of federal
regulation of immigrants. Indeed, the California state
legislature was being responsive to the same social movements
that prompted the Congress to introduce comprehensive
immigration reform proposals that would include federal
DREAM Acts and that also prompted executive action to
protect would-be beneficiaries of the federal DREAM Act from
deportation. 59
Applying the final check for state regulation that would
undermine federal law, AB 540 did not intend to discriminate
and would not run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause or
other Constitutional protections of "persons" that extend to
undocumented immigrants. Indeed, state laws of an
inclusionary nature such as state DREAM Acts are unlikely to
be struck down for unlawfully discriminating against
immigrants. 60
57. Id. at 868.
58. See generally Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism
Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2007)
(explaining the presumption against preemption and arguing that it is essential
in a world where state and federal governments share concurrent jurisdiction).
59. On June 12, 2012, President Obama announced his administration's
intentions to grant deferred action to certain undocumented immigrants brought
into the United States at a young age. See Barack Obama, President of the
United States, Remarks by the President on Immigration (June 15, 2012),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarks-
president-immigration. Applicants who are granted Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals (DACA) can reside openly in the country and may seek either
postsecondary education or employment for a period of two years; they typically
receive work authorization during this period to avoid running afoul of IRCA
prohibitions on working without lawful status. See Memorandum from Janet
Napolitano, Sec'y of Homeland Sec., U.S Dep't of Homeland Sec., to David
Aguilar, Acting Comm'r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Alejandro Mayorkas,
Director, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., and John Morton, Director, U.S.
Immigr. & Customs Enforcement, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with
Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children (June 15,
2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-
discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf. Notably, DACA recipients
do not adjust to lawful immigration status by virtue of the executive order; they
merely receive a temporary reprieve. See id. ("This memorandum confers no
substantive right, immigration status, or pathway to citizenship.").
60. But cf. Brief of Washington Legal Found. et al., as Amici Curiae in
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While the Martinez preemption analysis goes futher than
most judicial decisions reconciling federal and state law, it
stops short of embracing cooperative federalism in the fullest
form. A fuller reworking would venture beyond the preemption
analysis in evaluating shared regulation of immigrants
between borders.
CONCLUSION
This Essay has argued that cooperative federalism is
needed. Even in immigration. Especially in immigration. To be
clear, my point in setting forth a modified analysis is not to
trade federal exclusivity for state exclusivity; it is to recognize
that there are models for cooperative federalism in which
multiple levels of government work together in some instances.
The proposed model makes explicit presumptions that create
space for states to legitimately regulate immigrants between
borders in those instances. It also makes explicit how those
presumptions in favor of states can be overcome when needed
and appropriate.
Readers may ask whether the proposed framework too
conveniently favors inclusive rather than exclusive state
regulations. It is true that the Essay uses the example of an
inclusive state law to demonstrate a framework of cooperative
federalism. The choice of an inclusive state law reflects the
Essay's premise that broadening the analytical lens beyond the
exclusionary state laws typically scrutinized in immigration
federalism scholarship opens up new possibilities. However,
the proposed framework is not necessarily limited to inclusive
state regulation, even if it is limited to instances of states
regulating immigrants between borders. States and
municipalities can and do enact restrictive regulations for
immigrants between borders, such as city ordinances to restrict
rental housing for undocumented immigrants61 or state laws
exercising discretion to prohibit financial assistance or
Support of Petitioners at 14-20, Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2007) (No.
05-3309), reh'g denied, 511 F.3d 1030 (10th Cir. 2007), and cert. denied, 554 U.S.
918 (2008) (alleging that Kansas's in-state tuition rate discriminated against
granted United States citizen non-resident taxpayers in favor of undocumented
immigrants in violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
61. See Rodriguez, supra note 19, at 592 n.106 (citing and describing the
Hazleton, Pennsylvania municipal ordinances).
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admissions of undocumented students into colleges and
universities. 62 Sometimes those state regulations function
indirectly to enforce border laws (complicating the
implementation of the guiding principles proposed in this
Essay), but sometimes restrictionist state laws properly
regulate matters legitimately within the state's domain. In
those instances, the doctrinal framework should apply. On the
one hand, the possibility of both "good" and "bad" state laws-
to use the most reductionist formulation-is not new to
cooperative federalism. Variation is part and parcel of adopting
a decisional framework that focuses on who decides rather than
what they should decide. On the other hand, the possibility of
states enacting "bad" laws that infringe on the rights of
immigrants is particularly problematic. Cooperative federalism
in other contexts often calls for policy and decision-making to
move from courts to the political process. For example, Heather
Gerken acknowledges the risks to "minorities" and "dissenters"
and claims that "minority rule" may serve up benefits beyond
what "minority rights" can offer, particularly given that states
and localities outperform the federal government in
integration.63 The problem when applying this logic to
immigration is that democracy may not iron out the wrinkles
for immigrants who cannot vote and have limited political
power at every level of government. 64 That is why the caveat in
the proposed model includes a check for constitutional rights
62. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-1803(B) (2012) (prohibiting colleges
and universities from classifying undocumented immigrants as in-state students
for tuition purposes); see also John B. Lee et al., Study on the Admission of
Undocumented Students into the North Carolina Community College System, N.C.
COMMUNITY COLLEGE SYSTEM (Apr. 16, 2009), at 13-19, available at
http://www.necommunitycolleges.edulNewsReleases/NCCCS%20Final%20Report
.pdf (explaining the history and timeline of North Carolina's policy restricting the
admission of undocumented immigrants to community colleges, as well as the
state's communication with the Department of Homeland Security on the matter).
63. Heather Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, DEMOCRACY: A JOURNAL
OF IDEAS (2012), available at http://www.democracyjournal.org/24/a-new-
progressive-federalism.php?page=all.
64. That being said, states and localities perform integrative functions for
immigrants comparable to those performed for minorities and dissenters. Also,
the enactment of DREAM Acts in several states demonstrates that political
alliances can be forged between voters and immigrants, and that mobilized
immigrants can influence the political process. However, the vulnerability of
immigrants means that rights-protections cannot be ignored while promoting
cooperative federalism in immigration law. Increasing faith in state regulators is
encouraged, so long as it is not a blind faith that overlooks distinctive federal
protections.
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violations and emphasizes that the Equal Protection Clause
operates as an outer bounds on the mischief a state can make.
Continued elaboration of the operational framework for
cooperative federalism in immigration law would delineate the
parameters of the argument in this and other ways. Including
more examples of cooperative federalism in the immigrant
context would furnish a greater variety of power-sharing
arrangements between state-federal relationships and statutes
upon which the modified plenary power and preemption
doctrines can be applied. Future research in this vein should
set forth a typology of cooperative federalism that
demonstrates some important variations in statutory design:
federal statutes that expressly reach into domains regulated by
states and that enlist states in implementation of federal goals;
federal statutes that provide a meaningful opt-out provision
that permits parallel state regulation; and federal statutes that
empower or invite state regulation where the federal
government has been limited or dormant.65 As well, future
research should acknowledge that cooperative federalism
occurs not only by statutory design but also through de facto
circumstances.
This initial, brief account of cooperative federalism
operating through state DREAM Acts simplifies the
relationship between state and federal government in the
service of elucidating guiding principles that may apply more
generally. Among the simplifying assumptions is its depiction
of a direct relationship between two governmental entities:
state and federal legislatures. The reality is that DREAM Act
policy involves multiple actors, multiple branches of
government, and multiple types of law. As the Essay goes to
print, new scholarship is emerging that unpacks these
assumptions and teases out the dimensions of cooperative
federalism that implicate federal agencies in policy arenas
concurrently overseen by states.66 While this Essay does not by
65. These ideas are inspired by Abbe Gluck's typology of cooperative
federalism in the Affordable Care Act. See Abbe Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism
and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health
Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L. J. 534, 583-88 (2011).
66. For promising examples, see Catherine Y. Kim, Immigration Separation
of Powers and the President's Power to Preempt, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
(forthcoming 2014) (unpublished manuscript at 40, on file with author)
(contending that considerations unique to the immigration context undermine the
utility of existing doctrinal approaches to cabining executive preemptive authority
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itself provide a full doctrinal reworking of immigration
federalism, its modest contribution is twofold: to make the case
that a theoretical framework for cooperative federalism in
immigration law is needed, and to operationalize portions of
that framework in a way that can be applied, elaborated, and
improved on in future research.
and require a new approach to resolving immigration-related conflicts between
the executive branch and states) and David Rubenstein, Immigration
Structuralism: A Return to Form, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 81 (2013)
(setting forth a theory of immigration structuralism to resolve separation of
powers problems without hindering vertical federalism analysis). I am also
working on an article that fits into this emerging thread of scholarship. See
generally Ming H. Chen, Immigration and Administrative Federalism (Mar. 23,
2014) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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